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fka GREENE, CALLISTER & Case No. 940486-CA 
NEBEKER, a Utah Professional 
Corporation : Priority No 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Plaintiffs/Appellants Roland Holman and Andersen's Ford, Inc by and 
tli Richard C. Dibblee, and pursuant to Rule 35 of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure hereby petition this Court for a rehearing of 
the Court's decisioi i ill il I it: auovu if i it 11 lu* I case. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REHEARING 
1. Is this action governed u - +h~ M+~u Revised Model Business 
C in ] 
violate Article I, § 1 I of the Utah State Constitution? 
1 
2. Did plaintiffs/appellants appropriately raise the issue of implied 
attorney-client privilege at the trial level such that this Court should consider and 
address that issue? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS 
For purposes of this petition, this Court's statement of the case and facts 
is sufficient. See Ho/man, eta/, v. Cal/ister, Duncan & Nebeker (Case No. 940486-
CA, October 26, 1995), attached as Addendum A. 
ARGUMENT 
I. IF THE ACTIONS FILED BY HOLMAN AND ANDERSEN'S FORD 
ARE CONTROLLED BY UTAH CODE ANN. § § 16-10-100 AND -
101 AS OPPOSED TO THE UTAH REVISED MODEL BUSINESS 
CORPORATION ACT, THIS VIOLATES ARTICLE I, § 11 OF THE 
UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION. 
The actions filed by plaintiffs/appellants on July 13, 1994 {Andersen's Ford 
Inc. v. Callister, Duncan and Nebeker) and January 7, 1994 {Ho/man v. Callister, 
Duncan and Nebeker) should be governed by the Utah Revised Model Business 
Corporation Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 16-10a-101 to -1705, adopted in 1992, 
which provides that dissolving a corporation does not "prevent commencement of 
a proceeding by or against the corporation in its corporate name." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 16-10a-1405(2)(e) (1994). 
Alternatively, if Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1405is not applied to this case 
and the case is governed instead under former Utah Code Ann. § § 16-10-100 and 
2 
-101 (repealed in 1992), those statutes violate Article I ' t h e Utah State 
Constitution, which states that II courts shall be open, anu . r 
? HI11 in ma person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by 
due course of law, which shall be administered without denial. . .." See also Sun 
Valley Water Beds i 
1989) (statute unconstitutional because it did not provide an injured person with 
an effective and reasonable alternative remedy for vindication nf h ! c nr her 
c i 
unreasonable). If Utah Code Ann sk 16-10-1 OOand -101 are held to apply to this 
case and h=>r any redress to plaintiffs/appellants for the malpractic f 
defendant/appellee, this would violate not only Article I, § 11 of the Utah State 
Constitution but would also be a blatant and open invitation r thers to commit 
s h ; 
put forth by plaintiffs/appellants in their briefs and at oral argument, the Court did 
not analyze or address this argument in its opinion. Plaintiffs/appellants now 
rcspiM llully i rqu i 'M l l u l Ihr I D I I I I n l i l i r v , tins pni lnm nl l i i rn IHJUHIMi l 
3 
II. PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS APPROPRIATELY RAISED THE ISSUE 
OF IMPLIED ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
HOLMAN AND CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER AT THE 
TRIAL LEVEL SUCH THAT THIS COURT SHOULD CONSIDER 
AND ADDRESS THAT ISSUE. 
In its opinion, this Court found that plaintiff/appellant Holman did not raise 
the issue of an actual or implied attorney-client relationship between Holman and 
Callister, Duncan & Nebeker at the trial level. Therefore, this Court did not reach 
the merits of that argument which was also briefed and argued before the Court. 
In finding that plaintiff/appellant Holman did not raise the issue at the trial level the 
Court looked at the facts contained in plaintiff/appellant Holman's Affidavit in 
Support of his Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss.1 The Court's 
1The facts the Court found relevant from that affidavit are contained in the 
opinion and are as follows: 
2. At all times after January 1, 1982, Plaintiff held all of the 
shares of stock of "Andersen's Ford, Inc.", with the exception 
of the extremely minor holdings of two shares or stock held by 
his immediate family. 
3. For many years prior to January 1, 1982, defendant had acted 
as counsel to "Andersen's Ford, Inc." on virtually all matters 
regarding its business affairs, and had secured approval directly 
from plaintiff as to legal actions to be taken regarding the 
corporation. 
4. At all times after January 1, 1982, Plaintiff was the sole 
"director" or "officer" directing the actions and activities of the 
"corporation" and was known to defendant to be the sole 
person controlling the actions and operations of "Andersen's 
Ford, Inc." 
4 
opinion does not recite any facts or arguments contained in plaintiff/appellant 
Holman's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss. 
While plaintiff/appellant Holman believes the facts recited in the Court's 
opinion are alone sufficient to establish that the issue of an implied attorney-client 
relationship was raised at the trial level, he believes the following facts and 
statements taken from his Memorandum in Opposition further establish that such 
issue was raised: 
Plaintiff [Holman] contends that he retained and employed defendant 
[Callister, Duncan & Nebeker] to undertake the asserted legal actions, 
and that such services were subsequently performed on his behalf, 
under the name of "Andersen's Ford, Inc." The services were 
performed on his behalf because the corporation had been previously 
involuntarily dissolved and, prior to the negligence of which plaintiff 
complains, the "winding up" period of the corporation had similarly 
expired. After that time, there was no existing corporation which 
could remain a "client of Defendant" . . . . 
At all times after September of 1982, Plaintiff [Holman] was the sole 
stockholder, as well as the sole "director" or "officer" directing the 
actions and activities of the "corporation" and was the sole person 
controlling the actions and operations of "Andersen's Ford, Inc." 
* * * 
[L]ong after the dissolution of the Corporation "Andersen's Ford, 
Inc.", defendant continued to provide extensive legal services 
5. At all times during the relationship with defendant, plaintiff 
relied upon the advise and counsel of defendant on such 
matters. 
5 
regarding the Chapter 11 bankruptcy, including those acts which 
plaintiff claims to have constituted negligence and malpractice. 
(Emphasis removed). 
* * * 
In determining that the corporation had been involuntarily dissolved 
and had no statutory authority to engage in business at the time of 
the alleged negligence and malpractice, the Court necessarily 
determined that such services were not performed for the corporation 
but, rather, for the plaintiff doing business as "Andersen's Ford, Inc." 
* * # 
Failure to apply [the doctrines of] collateral estoppel, [res judicata and 
issue preclusion] to bar defendant's assertions that it provided such 
services for the corporation and not for the plaintiff herein, under the 
circumstances reflected above, would be contrary to the interests and 
policies upon which those doctrines are based. (Emphasis removed). 
* * * 
Plaintiff submits that collateral estoppel or, more specifically, "issue 
preclusion" should properly be applied to determine the issue that the 
defendant in this case could not, in fact have been representing a then 
non-existent corporation and, rather, were (sic) representing the 
plaintiff [Holman] doing business as "Andersen's Ford, Inc." 
* * * 
Defendant should not now be permitted to seek protection under a 
claim that the services were performed on behalf of that non-existent 
corporation, rather than on behalf of the plaintiff. 
* * * 
"Reverse Piercing" of the "corporate veil" [where plaintiff Holman is 
seen as the client rather than the corporation] in the manner sought 
by plaintiff in this action, is not foreign to Utah Law. 
6 
Furthermore, plaintiff/appellant Holman's Complaint itself alleges that since 
Andersen's Ford, Inc. was dissolved on September 30, 1982, Holman continued 
to operate the business under the trade name of Andersen's Ford, Inc., and to 
"remain a client of the Defendant [Callister, Duncan & Nebeker]." In dismissing 
plaintiff/appellant Holman's Complaint, Judge Young necessarily determined that 
Holman did not continue to "remain a client of [Callister, Duncan & Nebeker]" in 
either an actual or implied capacity. Based on the foregoing statements and 
arguments, plaintiffs/appellants now respectfully request that the Court reach and 
address this portion of their argument. 
CONCLUSION 
Wherefore, plaintiffs/appellants pray that this Court grant a rehearing in this 
case to further consider the arguments addressed in Part I of the opinion and reach 
the merits of the arguments addressed in Part II of the opinion. 
DATED this ^ day of November, 1995. 
RICHARD C. DIBBLEE 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
7 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing PETITION FOR REHEARING this <jr day of 
November, 1995, to the following: 
Cynthia K. C. Meyer 
Stephen G. Morgan 
Morgan & Hansen 
136 South Main Street, Eighth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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ADDENDUM A 
Court of Appeals' Opinion in Ho/man et al. v. Callister, Duncan & Nebeker 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
FILED 
OCT 2 6 1935 
COURT OF APPEALS 
Roland Holman, an individual 
dba Andersen's Ford, Inc., 
and Andersen's Ford, Inc., a 
Utah corporation, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
Callister, Duncan & Nebeker fka 
Greene, Callister & Nebeker, a 
Utah corporation, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
OPINION 
(For Official Publication) 
Case No. 940486-CA 
F I L E D 
(October 26, 1995) 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Leslie A. Lewis and 
The Honorable David S. Young 
Attorneys: Richard C. Dibblee, Salt Lake City, for Appellants 
Cynthia K. C. Meyer and Stephen G. Morgan, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Orme, Greenwood, and Wilkins. 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
In this consolidated appeal, Roland Holman and Andersen's 
Ford, Inc. appeal two orders of two district court judges 
dismissing their malpractice claims against Callister, Duncan, 
and Nebeker (Callister). We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
Because we are reviewing motions to dismiss, we recite the 
facts of this case in a light most favorable to appellants. 
Dansie v. Anderson Lumber Co., 878 P.2d 1155, 1156 (Utah App. 
1994) . We note that Callister's view of the facts is less 
egregious. 
Andersen's Ford, Inc. was a used car dealership in Brigham 
City, Utah. Holman was company president and majority 
stockholder. Beginning in January 1979, Andersen's Ford, Inc. 
experienced severe financial difficulties and, as a result, 
failed to pay state and federal taxes. On September 30, 1982, 
the State of Utah dissolved the company for failure to pay state 
taxes. Nonetheless, Holman continued to operate the business 
under the same name, Andersen's Ford, Inc. 
In late 1982, the Internal Revenue Service demanded 
immediate payment of back taxes and threatened to seize assets 
belonging to the company. During April of 1983, Holman consulted 
with Callister, and Callister recommended that Andersen's Ford, 
Inc. file a petition in U.S. Bankruptcy Court to reorganize under 
Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. Holman claims that 
Callister advised him that a Chapter 11 bankruptcy would allow 
the IRS taxes to be paid under the supervision of the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Court. On May 2, 1983, Callister filed a Chapter 11 
petition on behalf of Andersen's Ford, Inc. 
The IRS filed a claim in Andersen's Ford, Inc.'s bankruptcy 
proceedings for $154,004.83, which was later amended to 
$127,403.09. This claim was disputed, but the confirmed plan of 
reorganization provided that the, as-yet-undetermined, IRS claim 
would be paid over a five-year period, with annual payments of 
20% of the allowed claim plus interest. The IRS participated in 
the plan confirmation hearing and knew of the approved plan's 
terms. 
In 1984, after the bankruptcy court approved the 
reorganization plan, a settlement was reached with the IRS for 
the payment of $56,000 in delinquent taxes. Holman claims 
Callister failed to include this settlement agreement amount as 
part of the record in the bankruptcy court either by 
incorporating the amount of the settlement in an amendment or 
addendum to the reorganization plan or by filing an appropriate 
petition or motion. Holman claims this failure resulted in a 
later demand by the IRS for approximately $122,000 in additional 
payments for taxes, interest and penalties. 
The IRS would not abide by the earlier settlement. Holman 
hired a different law firm to represent the company in further 
bankruptcy proceedings because the Callister attorneys were 
needed as witnesses to the settlement negotiations with the IRS. 
The new law firm filed an adversary proceeding, claiming the IRS 
was bound by the terms of the settlement. Following a bench 
trial, the bankruptcy court determined that the IRS was bound by 
the 1984 settlement agreement, but that Andersen's Ford, Inc. had 
underpaid the agreed-upon amount by $21,000. 
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Two civil complaints were filed against Callister: First, 
by Andersen's Ford, Inc. as plaintiff, on July 14, 1993, and 
second, by Holman, dba Andersen's Ford, Inc., on January 7, 1994. 
Each complaint alleged that Callister committed legal malpractice 
by failing to incorporate the settlement agreement into the 
bankruptcy court record. Both lawsuits alleged damages of 
$96, 000--$75,000 in attorney fees and accounting costs and 
$21,000 for the assessment of additional taxes. 
The Andersen's Ford, Inc. suit was assigned to Third 
District Court Judge Leslie A. Lewis. Callister filed a motion 
to dismiss and/or for summary judgment. Judge Lewis dismissed 
the case on December 21, 1993, stating that Andersen's Ford, 
Inc.'s claim was barred because it arose after corporate 
dissolution and the suit was not part of corporate wind-up 
activities. 
The second case, filed by Holman personally, was assigned to 
Third District Judge David S. Young. Once again, Callister filed 
a motion to dismiss and/or for summary judgment, this time 
contending that Andersen's Ford, Inc. was the law firm's client, 
and thus, the real party in interest. Moreover, Callister argued 
that if Andersen's Ford, Inc. were found to be the real party in 
interest, then the case must be dismissed based on the res 
judicata effect of Judge Lewis' ruling. Judge Young dismissed 
the case with prejudice on May 5, 1994. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Holman and Andersen's Ford, Inc. raise the following issues 
on appeal: 
(1) Did the trial court err in ruling that a dissolved 
corporation is statutorily barred from pursuing a tort claim 
after its dissolution? 
(2) Did the trial court err in concluding that Holman was 
not a proper party plaintiff in the malpractice action against 
the law firm that represented Andersen's Ford, Inc. during the 
bankruptcy reorganization proceedings? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Because the trial courts received and considered factual 
allegations outside the pleadings, the motions to dismiss and/or 
for summary judgment are properly considered motions for summary 
judgment. Thayne v. Beneficial Utah, Inc., 874 P.2d 120, 124 
(Utah 1994) . Therefore, in our review, we consider the evidence 
940486-CA 3 
and all inferences in a light most favorable to the losing party 
and will sustain the grant of summary judgment only if there are 
no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Winegar v. Froerer 
Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 107 (Utah 1991). 
ANALYSIS 
I. Lawsuits by Dissolved Corporations. 
Holman asserts that Judge Lewis erred in dismissing the 
malpractice claim filed by the corporation. Holman argues that 
if the relevant Utah statutes are construed as barring the 
corporation's malpractice claim before the cause of action has 
accrued, the statutes would violate the Utah Constitution, which 
provides that "no person shall be barred from prosecuting or 
defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself or 
counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party." Utah Const, 
art. I, § 1 1 . 
Under Utah law in effect at the time these cases arose, a 
corporation, its directors, officers or shareholders could pursue 
legal remedies "for any right or claim existing . . . prior to 
such dissolution if action or other proceeding thereon is 
commenced within two years after the date of such dissolution." 
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-100 (repealed July 1, 1992) (emphasis 
added). Utah law also allowed a dissolved corporation to 
continue a limited existence to "wind up" its affairs with 
respect to property and assets that had not been distributed or 
otherwise disposed of. Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-101 (repealed July 
1, 1992) . " [T]o effect such purpose [,] such corporation may sell 
or otherwise dispose of such property and assets, sue and be 
sued, contract, and exercise all other incidental and necessary 
powers."1 Id. In addition, Callister asserts, without dispute 
from Holman, that section 108(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides 
that if nonbankruptcy law fixes the time within which a debtor 
may commence an action and such time has not expired prior to the 
filing of the bankruptcy petition, such action may be commenced 
only before the later of either the end of such period or two 
years following the filing of the petition. 11 U.S.C.A. § 108(a) 
(West 1993) . 
1. In 1992, the Utah Legislature adopted the Revised Model 
Business Corporation Act, which states that dissolving a 
corporation does not "prevent commencement of a proceeding by or 
against the corporation in its corporate name." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 16-10a-1405(2)(e) (Supp. 1994). 
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Under the facts of this case, the State of Utah dissolved 
Andersen's Ford, Inc. on September 30, 1982. The Chapter 11 
petition was filed on May 3, 1983, within the two year period 
provided by Utah law. Andersen's Ford, Inc.'s corporate capacity 
for some purposes, was arguably extended two years beyond the 
date of filing the bankruptcy petition, to May 3, 1985. See 11 
U.S.C.A. § 108(a) (West 1993). The Amended Plan of 
Reorganization was entered by the Bankruptcy Court on October 4, 
1984. The IRS letter incorporating the agreed-upon amount owed 
to it by Andersen's Ford, Inc. was dated November 2, 1984. The 
malpractice alleged by Andersen's Ford, Inc. was the failure to 
include the IRS settlement in the approved plan of 
reorganization. The corporation did not file suit for the 
alleged malpractice until 1994, well after the time that its 
corporate existence, in any form, had ceased. 
We conclude that these statutes do not allow a dissolved 
corporation to pursue claims for malpractice after it has ceased 
to exist in any manner as a corporate entity. Clearly, 
Andersen's Ford, Inc. lacked any capacity to bring this suit in 
1994, almost ten years after its legal existence had ceased. 
Nor is there any common law basis for the corporation to 
pursue the malpractice claim. Under the common law, a 
corporation ceased to exist at dissolution. Platz v. 
International Smelting Co., 61 Utah 342, 350-51, 213 P. 187, 190 
(1922). For that reason, a dissolved corporation was "incapable 
of maintaining an action; and all such actions pending at the 
time of dissolution abate, in the absence of a statute to the 
contrary." Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Forty-One Thirty-Six 
Wilcox Bldg. Corp., 302 U.S. 120, 125, 58 S. Ct. 125, 127 (1937). 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's order 
dismissing the malpractice action filed on behalf of the 
corporation.2 
II. Proper Party. 
Holman also contends that Judge Young, the trial judge in 
the second case, erred in ruling Holman was not a proper party 
plaintiff. The trial court dismissed Holman's complaint after 
concluding that Andersen's Ford, Inc., not Holman, was the party 
2. We have considered Holman's argument that the trial court's 
interpretation of the relevant statutes violated the Utah 
Constitution and find it to be without merit. State v. Carter, 
776 P.2d 886, 888 (Utah 1989) (stating appellate courts "need not 
analyze and address in writing each and every argument, issue, or 
claim raised"). 
940486-CA 5 
in interest and, thus, an indispensable party to the lawsuit. 
Additionally, Judge Young concluded that even if Andersen's Ford, 
Inc. were joined, the case would still have to be dismissed 
because of the res judicata effect of Judge Lewis' dismissal of 
the complaint previously filed on behalf of Andersen's Ford, Inc. 
Holman claims that although Andersen's Ford, Inc. was 
Callister's client, Callister had an implied attorney/client 
relationship with him personally. Holman argues that Callister 
knew he was continuing to operate the business, despite the 
corporate dissolution, and nevertheless advised him to file the 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition to halt the IRS's attempts to 
collect taxes for which both he and the corporation were liable. 
Holman relies primarily on the Utah Supreme Court case of 
Maraulies by Maraulies v. Upchurch, 696 P.2d 1195 (Utah 1985). 
In Maraulies, the court found a conflict of interest existed 
because an attorney-client relationship could be implied when 
attorneys representing a physicians' limited partnership also 
undertook to represent a patient in a lawsuit against one of the 
partner physicians. JEd. at 1200. The court held that 1![e]ven in 
the absence of an express attorney-client relationship, 
circumstances may give rise to an implied professional 
relationship or a fiduciary duty toward the client, thereby 
invoking the ethical mandates governing the practice of law." 
Id. 
Callister argues that Holman's claim of an implied attorney-
client relationship should not be considered because it is a new 
argument raised for the first time on appeal. Callister cites 
Oner International (U.S.A.) Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 
455 n.31 (Utah 1993), in which the Utah Supreme Court stated that 
the trial court must address an argument before it may be 
considered on appeal. An argument will be deemed to have been 
raised before the trial court if the trial court had an 
opportunity to enter findings of fact and/or conclusions of law. 
James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah App. 1987). The 
argument must be reasonably discernible from the pleadings, 
affidavits and exhibits. Jd. Moreover, even when an appellate 
court liberally construes the record in favor of a party, as it 
must on review of a summary judgment, there must be a "factual 
showing or . . . submission of legal authority" before the 
argument will be deemed to have been raised at the trial court 
level. Id. 
We therefore look to the record before the trial court, to 
determine whether there were disputed issues of material fact or 
legal argument presented on the issue of a possible implied 
attorney-client relationship. In doing so, we resolve all doubts 
in favor of Holman and allow for all reasonable inferences. 
940486-CA 6 
The pertinent record before us consists of the pleadings, 
Holman's memorandum in opposition to the motion to dismiss, and 
his affidavit supporting that memorandum. It is clear from this 
record that Holman did not explicitly raise the issue before the 
trial court. He did not cite any case law relevant to an implied 
attorney-client relationship and did not allege that Callister 
undertook to advise him in a personal capacity or even discussed 
with him any potential personal liability. In addition, the 
record does not include any factual assertions which might 
indicate an implied attorney-client relationship. The relevant 
portion of Holman's affidavit read as follows: 
2. At all times after January 1, 1982, 
Plaintiff held all of the shares of stock of 
"Andersen's Ford, Inc.', with the exception 
of the extremely minor holdings of two shares 
of stock held by his immediate family. 
3. For many years prior to January 1, 1982, 
defendant had acted as counsel to "Andersen's 
Ford, Inc." on virtually all matters 
regarding its business affairs, and had 
secured approval directly from plaintiff as 
to legal actions to be taken regarding the 
corporation. 
4. At all times after January 1, 1982, 
Plaintiff was the sole "director" or 
"officer" directing the actions and 
activities of the "corporation" and was known 
to defendant to be the sole person 
controlling the actions and operations of 
"Andersen's Ford, Inc." 
5. At all times during the relationship with 
defendant, plaintiff relied upon the advice 
and counsel of defendant on such matters. 
None of these facts demonstrate the requisite factual showing 
with regard to the existence of an implied attorney-client 
relationship. All of the references are limited solely to the 
relationship between Andersen's Ford, Inc. and Callister, not to 
the relationship with Holman individually. 
Having examined the record on appeal, we do not believe 
Holman raised the issue of an implied lawyer-client relationship 
before the trial court in a sufficient manner to allow the court 
to analyze and decide the issue. Moreover, Holman did not assert 
facts which, if believed and construed in his favor, would 
establish an implied attorney-client relationship. We therefore 
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conclude that the trial court did not err in granting Callister's 
motion to dismiss. 
CONCLUSION 
The malpractice action filed on behalf of Andersen's Ford, 
Inc. was properly dismissed. The State of Utah had dissolved the 
corporation and all possible extension periods had expired prior 
to the time this action was filed. Lacking a legal existence, 
the corporation could not assert a cause of action. 
We also conclude the trial court did not err in dismissing 
Holman's action against Callister. Holman failed to raise the 
issue of a possible implied attorney/client relationship before 
the trial court by not alleging facts or presenting legal 
arguments which would preserve such claim. 
Affirmed. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
I CONCUR: 
Michael J.Mtfilkins, Judge 
I CONCUR, 
EXCEPT AS TO SECTION I, IN WHICH I CONCUR IN RESULT ONLY 
Gregory K/^rme, Presiding Judge 
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